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NOTES AND COMMENT
It is submitted that directors should be required to make full dis-
closure of their conflicting interests and that such information be
available to the stockholders and creditors of the corporation, with a
statutory penalty for noncompliance.
Another remedy is suggested in the case of Simonson v.
Helburn,3 9 where a corporation conducting theatrical plays permitted
administrative directors to engage in personal ventures, provided the
question of competition with the corporation was first passed on by
an umpire. The court held this a valid and commendable device to
protect both director and corporation before any harm is done. Con-
flicting interests should be brought into the open; for it is difficult
to perceive the value of secrecy in promoting business efficiency.
Corporation law does not exist in the abstract; the word cor-
poration ". . . has a variable, not a constant, meaning. The rights
and obligations that are comprised within the compass of the word
[corporation] change not only with time, but with locality." 40 The
corporate form of enterprise is designed to serve the community at
large and not a small group of entrepreneurs. The expansion of our
economy has produced an entirely new corporate structure,4 ' and
the law must adjust to the complexities of that economy and the new
corporate structure incident thereto to protect the interests of all
those involved. Only in this way will it perpetuate the efficiency
which is the cornerstone of our material strength.
DUAL EDUCATION V. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
Introduction
When Chief Justice Taney wrote his celebrated opinion in the
famous Dred Scott decision,' he argued that the foundation of the
American State had not included the Negro as a participating ele-
ment or as a beneficiary of its privileges. 2 Union victory in the Civil
War and the subsequent adoption of constitutional amendments
purporting to give the Negro equal status with the whites have de-
stroyed the legal efficacy of that ruling,3 but in our southern states,
39 198 Misc. 430, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
40 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N. Y.
Supp. 532, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
41For a detailed analysis of the economic aspects of this problem, see
BERa & MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PaIVATE PRoPERTY (1933).
1 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1856).
2Id. at 407; BOND, EDUCAT ON OF THE NEGRO IN THE AmmERICAN SOCIAL
OiuER 3 (1934).
3 This is not to imply that the Dred Scott decision no longer has value
as a legal precedent. See MoTT, DUE PRocEss OF LAW 329 (1926).
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its spirit has continued to live. 4 The equality which those amend-
ments conferred in theory has proved illusory in fact, and so the
struggle for equal status continues unabated. When the conflict has
reached the courts, it has generally centered about the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Most
frequently, the disputes have involved one of four specific problems:
(1) the validity of real covenants restricting the alienation of land to
Negroes; 6 (2) the right of the Negro to vote in primary elections; 7
(3) the right of Negroes to be tried by juries from which members
of their race have not been systematically excluded; 8 and (4) the
validity of state laws which require segregation of the races in tax-
supported schools.9
A general examination of each of the enumerated problems, or
even a detailed treatment of a particular one of them, is not within
the intended scope of this writing. Instead, it is proposed to present
4 A good statement of the views of the moderate Southerner is that made
by four Southern members of the President's Commission on Higher Educa-
tion. The majority report of the committee had recommended abolition of
segregation in public schools. The Southern members dissented: "The under-
signed wish to record their dissent from the Commission's pronouncements
on 'segregation,' especially as these pronouncements are related to education in
the South. We recognize that many conditions affect adversely the lives of
our Negro citizens, and that gross inequality of opportunity, economic and
educational, is a fact. We are concerned that as rapidly as possible conditions
should be improved, inequalities removed, and greater opportunity provided for
all our people. But we believe that efforts towards these ends must, in the
South, be made within the established patterns of social relationships, which
require separate institutions for whites and Negroes. We believe that pro-
nouncements such as these of the Commission on the question of segregationjeopardize these efforts, impede progress, and threaten tragedy to the people
of the South, both white and Negro. We recognize the high purpose and the
theoretical idealism of the Commission's recommendations. But a doctrinaire
position which ignores the facts of history and the realities of the present is
not one that will contribute constructively to the solution of difficult problems
of human relationships." 2 PRnSIDENT'S Co i issioN ON HIGHER EDUCATION,
HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 29 (1947), quoted in Note,
1 VAND. L. REv. 403, 405 n. 12 (1948).
5 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deiy to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. (Italics added.)
6 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) (covenants are valid, but
may not be judicially enforced). Compare Weiss v. Leaon, 225 S. W. 2d 127
(Mo. 1949). Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917).
7 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.
2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948).
8 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879) ; Patton v. Mississippi,
332 U. S. 463 (1947).
9 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U. S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Rezents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Gong Lum v. Rice,
275 U. S. 78 (1927) ; Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 (1899).
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a survey and analysis of the principal judicial solutions which have
been offered in answer to the challenging constitutional questions
posed by the maintenance of segregated schools in our southern
states.'0
Importance of the Problem
The education of its citizens has long been recognized as one
of the established functions of government. In the United States,
responsibility for the proper performance of this function has gen-
erally been accepted and traditionally is discharged by the individual
states. Thus, state governments have established and maintain edu-
cational facilities, which provide training from the elementary through
the graduate, and sometimes professional, school levels. Moreover,
it is usually required that all citizens, during the greater period of
their minority, either attend the public schools or obtain a private
education."
But though the function of education has been assumed by the
states, individually, the educational development of its youth is never-
theless a matter of vital concern to the family and the Nation.1
2
Also of vital concern, is the practice, prevalent in many southern
states, of providing a dual system of schools and a double standard
of education predicated upon the race or color of the persons
attending.' 3
Formerly, it was held that public education was in the nature
of a state bounty and that the state might limit or qualify that bounty
at its discretion.' 4 But since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, segregation laws have generally been sustained only in those
cases where the facilities offered to Negro students were substan-
tially equal to those afforded persons of other races.'5
Separate But Equal Facilities
That segregation, if accompanied by the maintenance of substan-
tially equal facilities for the separate races, is not a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause was established by the Supreme Court in
10 For a general discussion of these problems, see Waite, The Negro in the
Supreme Court, 30 MINN. L. REv. 219 (1946); Frank and Munro The Orig-
inal Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COL. L. REv. 131
(1950) (excellent historical treatment). See also Notes, 1 VAND. L. REv. 403
(1948), 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947).
"1 For a table of state compulsory attendance laws, see MARKE, EDUCATIONAL
LAW 95 (1949).1 2 See REPORT OF BOARD OF OFFICERS UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN
THE POsT-WAR ARMIY (1946).
13 Seventeen states require segregation of the races in schools. In some in-
stances, the requirement is a constitutional one; in others it is statutory, and in
many states it is both. MARKE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 18.
14 See Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332 (1850) (by implication).
15 See note 9 supra.
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Plessy v. Ferguson.'6 In that case, the Court sustained the validity
of a Louisiana statute which called for equal but separate accommo-
dations for the white and colored races on intrastate passenger trains.
The Court reasoned that the compulsory segregation of the races did
not imply the inferiority of either group to the other,' 7 and hence was
not violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
Although it did not involve the question, the Plessy case has
become authority for the proposition that segregation of the races in
tax-supported schools is not per se unconstitutional.' 8  Applying the
principle there laid down that separate but equal facilities will suffice
to comply with the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, state
courts have repeatedly sustained laws which require the separation
of Negro and white pupils in public schools.' 9 However, where the
state has not itself authorized separate schools for colored children,
it has been held that a school board has no right to establish them,
and exclude such children from the other schools. 20
The Supreme Court has never ruled squarely on the constitu-
tionality of segregation in public schools, but by implication, it has
given its approval to the application of the "separate but equal" doc-
trine to such cases. Thus, in Gong Lurn v. Rice,21 the Court sus-
tained a Mississippi school board in its ruling that a child of Chinese
ancestry belonged to the "colored" race for purposes of education.22
Although the validity of segregation was not in issue,2 3 the Court
assumed its constitutionality, and in broad terms, established a prece-
dent which has proved a major stumbling block for the opponents
of segregation in education. 24 Again, in Cumnming v. Board of Edu-
16 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
17 "Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where
they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority
of either race to the other .... " Id. at 544. "We consider the underlying
fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.
If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely be-
cause the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id. at 551.
I1 Its authority for this latter application stems from the following dictum
appearing in the case: "The most common instance of this [segregation] is
connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored
children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power
even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have
been longest and most earnestly enforced." Id. at 544.
19 The cases are collected in Note, 103 A. L. R. 713 (1936); see also
5 R. C. L. 595 (1914).
20 People ex rel. Longress v. Board of Education, 101 Ill. 308 (1882); Knox
v. Board of Education, 45 Kan. 152, 25 Pac. 616 (1891).
21275 U. S. 78 (1927).
22 Rice v. Gong Lum, 139 Miss. 760, 104 So. 105 (1925).
23 Indeed, petitioner's counsel argued that race may reasonably be used as a
basis for classification for purposes of education. See summary of argument,
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78-79 (1927).
24 Consider the language of the federal court for the Eastern District of
South Carolina in the recent case of Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D.
S. C. 1951): "Directly in point and absolutely controlling upon us so long
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cation,25 an injunction was denied, where the prayer demanded that
school officials be restrained from continuing in operation a high
school for whites without reopening a high school for Negroes which
had been shut down. In still another case,26 the Court sustained the
conviction of an unincorporated private school for the violation of a
segregated education statute. Thus, while the Court has never ex-
pressly approved the application of the separate but equal doctrine to
segregated schools, it has repeatedly ignored opportunities to con-
demn the practice.
It has been charged that "... public schools 'separate but equal'
in theory are in fact and in practical administration consistently un-
equal and discriminatory." 27 Assuming for the moment that "sep-
arate but equal" facilities in education will suffice to comply with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question arises:
what is meant by "equal" facilities?
The answer to this question has been pondered by both state
and federal courts for over half a century; indeed, the judiciary began
the task of defining equal facilities even before the Plessy case estab-
lished such as the criteria for constitutional validity.28
Generally, it has been held that the rule that separate educational
facilities must be equal does not require that school buildings be iden-
tical in size or value.29  Nor does it matter that attendance at the
segregated school will require the Negro child to travel a greater dis-
tance than white children.30 But where the school for Negro children
is so located that access to it requires the child to travel a difficult or
dangerous route, it has been held that substantially equal facilities
were not provided.81
Ordinarily it is required, in theory at least, that a proportionate
number of teachers, possessing substantially the same qualifications,
be assigned to instruct in the segregated schools.32 Similarly, it is
said that the length of the academic term should be approximately
the same in both the schools maintained for colored children and those
as it stands unreversed by the Supreme Court is Gong Lum v. Rice.... Al-
though attempt is made to distinguish this case, it cannot be distinguished. The
question as to the validity of segregation in the public schools on the ground
of race was squarely raised, the Fourteenth Amendment was relied upon as
forbidding segregation and the issue was squarely met by the Court." Id. at
532. See Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797, 799 (D. Kan. 1951).
25 175 U. S. 528 (1899).
26 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
27 From relator's brief, Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S. W. 2d 442, 444 (1948).
28 See Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849); Lehew v.
Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765 (1890).29 Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903).
30 Wright v. Board of Education, 129 Kan. 852, 284 Pac. 363 (1930) ; Lehew
v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765 (1890).31 Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908).
32 See Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267 (1905) ; Jones
v. Board of Education, 90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923).
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operated for white students.83 Again, where a state statute author-
ized a municipality to levy an ad valorem tax for the benefit of the
public schools, but directed that the tax collected of white persons be
used to support white schools only, and that monies received from
Negroes be used to sustain Negro education facilities only, such tax
was said to be unconstitutional since its effect was to produce gross
inequality of opportunity.3 4
Many of these cases have arisen when Negroes have sought pro-
fessional or graduate instruction in state-operated universities.35
What the required standard of equality is in such cases was stated
by the Supreme Court in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada 36 and in
the more recent case of Sipuel v. Board of Regents. 37 In the Gaines
case, the Court declared that the state's responsibility to provide all
its citizens with equal opportunities for education was not fulfilled
by a provision authorizing curators of the state university to arrange
scholarships for Negro citizens of Missouri to attend law schools in
adjacent states, when a law school for whites was an established part
of the state university. In so ruling, the Court declared:
.* * the State was bound to furnish him withi its borders facilities for
legal education substantially equal to those which the state there afforded for
persons of the white race, whether or not other negroes sought the same
opportunity. (Italics supplied.) 38
To' these requisites, there was added in the Sipuel case the re-
quirement that such facilities be made available to Negroes, ". . . as
soon as they are made available to applicants of other groups." 89
In two cases decided last year, the Supreme Court made sub-
stantial alterations in the traditional concept of equal facilities. In
the first, Sweatt v. Painter,40 the petitioner, a Negro, had applied for
admission to the School of Law of the University of Texas. Admit-
tedly, he possessed every essential qualification except that of race
upon which sole ground his application was denied. In an action for
a writ of mandamus to compel his admission, the trial court issued
an interlocutory order allowing the State six months in which to
establish a law school for Negroes with facilities substantially equal
to those afforded whites. When a law school had been made avail-
able,4 ' the state court denied mandamus on the ground that substan-
33 Ibid.
34 Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16 Fed. 297 (D. Ky. 1883).
35 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U. S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U. S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
36305 U. S. 337 (1938).
87 332 U. S. 631 (1948).
88 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 351 (1938).
39 Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631, 633 (1948).
40 339 U. S. 629 (1950).
4" "The University of Texas Law School has 16 full-time professors, 850
students, a library of 65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court facilities,
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tially equal facilities had been provided.42  The Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground that the facilities offered were not substantially
equivalent. In its opinion, the Court made special reference to the
qualities which make for "greatness" in a law school, and pointed
out that equality in education demands more than substantially equal
buildings, classroom furniture and appliances. It requires as well
that there be equality in all the intangibles that come into play in
preparing one for meeting life. In the words of the Court:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to
a far greater degree those qualities which ... make for greatness in a law
school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing
in the community, traditions and prestige. The law school, the proving ground
for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the indi-
viduals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no
one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, re-
moved from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the
law is concerned. The law school to which Texas is willing to admit peti-
tioner excludes from its student body members of the racial groups which
number 85% of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers,
witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevi-
tably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas bar. With such a
substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we canwt conclude that
the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would
receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School. (Italics supplied.) 43
In the second case, McLaurin v. Oklaholn, 44 a Negro had been
admitted to graduate instruction at the University of Oklahoma, sub-
ject to such rules and regulations as to segregation as the president
of the university should consider to afford him educational oppor-
tunities substantially equal to those offered other persons seeking the
same education. Pursuant to this qualification, he was required to
occupy an assigned seat in a row specified for colored students, and
to sit at designated tables in the school library and cafeteria. He
contended that this restrictive treatment was discriminatory and vio-
lative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court sustained his con-
tention, and concluded that the Constitution precludes differences in
treatment by the state based upon race. One passage from the Court's
opinion is especially significant:
scholarship funds, an Order of the Coif affiliation, many distinguished alumni,
and much tradition and prestige. The separate law school for Negroes has
five full-time professors, 23 students, a library of 16,500 volumes, a practice
court, a legal aid association and one alumnus admitted to the Texas Bar; ...
-Syllabus, 339 U. S. 629 (1950).
42 Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S. W. 2d 442 (1948).
43 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634 (1950). See 3 ALA. L. Rxv. 181
(1950). ". . . the two decisions [Sweatt and McLauri] lead one to conclude
the Supreme Court considers segregation by the states unconstitutional per se."
Id. at 185.
44 339 U. S. 637 (1950).
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There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restric-
tions imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of stu-
dents, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no
such bar.45
Thus, to the components of the formula for "equal facilities" the
Court added two new and important ingredients: (1) academic pres-
tige, and (2) freedom from state restrictions which prohibit "intel-
lectual commingling" with the students of other races. Since it is
generally recognized that academic prestige is not of any compelling
importance on the high school and grammar school levels, the deci-
sion in the Painter case will probably be of importance only in cases
where Negroes are seeking admission to institutions of higher learn-
ing.4 6  On the other hand, the rationale of the McLaurin case-the
assumption that students have a right to unhampered "intellectual
commingling"--poses a more vital question-a question which strikes
at the very roots of the dual system of education in force throughout
the south. Can it logically be maintained that the right to unham-
pered intellectual association is the exclusive property of students in
graduate and professional schools? Or is it a right common to all
who study at any level?
Present Status of the "Separate but Equal" Doctrine
These questions, and the more fundamental one of the consti-
tutionality of the "separate but equal" doctrine as applied to dual
education remain unanswered. Within recent months, however, the
constitutionality of racial segregation in publicly financed grammar
and high schools has again been under attack in the federal courts.
Three current cases are worthy of note.
In Briggs v. Elliott,47 decided in the fourth circuit, plaintiffs
sought to have declared unconstitutional certain South Carolina stat-
utes which required segregation of the races in public schools. 48 They
also prayed for an injunction prohibiting school officials from con-
tinuing such statutes in operation. On trial of the action, defendants
admitted that substantial inequalities, prejudicial to plaintiffs, were
45 Id. at 641.
46 But see 8 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 54 (1951). "The implication of this
conclusion [Sweatt decision] are readily discernible: Any Negro institution
which excludes white students, irrespective of its size, facilities, reputation or
national standing, is inferior per se; or so the Court seems to say. . . . It is
evident . . . that this new interpretation of 'equal' may mean that 'separate' is
no longer possible." Id. at 59-60. See also 30 B. U. L. REv. 565 (1950) ; 24
TEmPLE L. Q. 222 (1950) ; 36 VA. L. REv. 797 (1950).
47 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951).
48 S. C. CoNsT. Art. XI, § 7: "Separate schools shall be provided for chil-
dren of the white and colored races, and no child of either race shall ever
be permitted to attend a school provided for children of the other race." S. C.
CoDE § 5377 provides: ". . . it shall be unlawful for pupils of one race to
attend the schools provided by boards of trustees for persons of another race."
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existent in the school system, but announced a policy and a plan
potential for the elimination of such inequalities. The court held,
one judge dissenting, that plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration to
the effect that substantial inequalities existed, and also to a manda-
tory injunction compelling school officials to equalize educational
facilities. The court concluded, however, that segregation as required
by the South Carolina statutes was not per se a denial of equal pro-
tection, and reasoned that the constitutional right to unhampered in-
tellectual commingling, which exists on the graduate and professional
school levels, is non-existent for grammar and high school pupils. 49
A contrary result was reached in Gonzales v. Sheely.50 There
the court, pondering the validity of a schoolboard policy which re-
quired segregation of pupils of Latin descent from those of other
ancestry, found as one fact inter alia that Spanish-speaking children
were retarded in learning English by lack of exposure to it,51 and
that ". . . commingling of the entire student body instills and de-
velops a common cultural attitude among the children, which is im-
perative for the perpetuation of American institutions and ideals." r2
It concluded that "unified school associations, regardless of lineage"
were essential ingredients of any formula for educational equality. 3
In still another case,54 a three-judge court for the District of
Kansas, finding all other factors equal, remarked that if the denial
of the right to commingle with the majority group in higher institu-
tions of learning is lack of due process, it is difficult to see why such
denial would not result in the same lack of due process when prac-
ticed on the lower academic planes.55 Nevertheless, the court ruled
49 
"The problem of segregation as applied to graduate and professional edu-
cation is essentially different from that involved in segregation in education at
the lower levels.
".... At this level, as good education can be afforded in Negro schools as
,in white schools and the thought of establishing professional contacts does not
enter into the picture." Briggs v. Elliott, q8 F. Supp. 529, 535 (E. D. S. C.
1951).5096 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951).
5 1 1d. at 1007.
52 Ibid.5 3Id. at 1009. The court seems to have borrowed the phrase from the
earlier case of Mendez v. Westminister School District, 64 F. Supp. 544, 549
(S. D. Cal. 1946). In that case, the federal court for the Southern District
of California ruled that arbitrary assignment of Mexican children to separate
schools was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, the deci-
sion was affirmed, but the affirmance was predicated on the ground that segre-
gation was a violation of California law, and that federal courts have juris-
diction to prevent unequal application of state statutes. The question of whether
or not segregation violates the Federal Constitution was not passed upon.
Westminister School District v. Mendez, 161 F. 2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
54 Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
55 Id. at 800. It would seem that the court here misinterpreted the Swealt
and McLaurin decisions. "Intellectual Commingling" was classified in those
cases as an element of the equality required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Neither the Sweatt case nor the McLaurin decision considered due process.
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that inasmuch as no tangible inequalities existed in the schools under
examination, their maintenance on a segregated basis offended neither
due process nor equal protection of the laws. 56
Both the latter case and the Briggs case are being appealed. 57
If certiorari is granted in both, the Supreme Court will be faced with
the necessity of considering the applicability of the McLaurin ra-
tionale to elementary and secondary schools, and may even choose
to rule on the more basic question of the constitutionality of segre-
gation per se. An examination of the relevant issues would seem to
be in order.
Separate but Equal-Appraised
It is evident that the case for segregated schools must stand or
fall on the correctness of the decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson 58 and
Gong Lurn v. Rice. 9  The Plessy case, as was noted earlier, estab-
lished the doctrine that separate but equal facilities would suffice to
fulfill the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Gong
Lur ruling acknowledged the applicability of that doctrine to cases
involving the validity of segregated schools. 60 It can be conceded,
therefore, that the established precedents do sustain the constitution-
ality of segregation in education. Whether or not the established
precedents can themselves be sustained is another question.
The decision in the Plessy case, and the rulings in all subsequent
cases which have upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation,
have been predicated upon two interrelated principles, one, of law,
and the other, of fact. The legal principle, simply stated, assumes
that segregation statutes are a valid exercise of a state's police power,
when enacted with reference to the established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the preservation of public
58 See Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D. Kan. 1951).
57 Communication to ST. JOHN's L. REv. from Mr. Jack Greenberg, Counsel,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Some indication
that the Supreme Court may yet be unwilling to abandon the doctrine of sep-
arate but equal facilities can be found in its recent refusal to grant certiorari
in the case of Bagsby v. Trustees of Pleasant Grove Independent School Dis-
trict, 20 U. S. L. WEEK 3085 (U. S. Oct. 9, 1951). In that case, it was held
that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment were satisfied by an ar-
rangement pursuant to which Negro school children were transported three
and one-half miles in a free school bus from the school district of their resi-
dence to an adjoining school district where they were permitted to attend
accredited colored schools whose facilities were equal to those afforded white
students within the district where the Negroes resided. For the contentions
of counsel, see 20 U. S. L. WEK 3036 (U. S. July 31, 1951).
58 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
59275 U. S. 78 (1927).
60 It is frequently argued that the Gong Lurn case did not sustain the valid-
ity of segregation per se. True, it can be distinguished, but the decision is
pregnant with the implication that the separate but equal doctrine is applicable
to education.
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peace and good order.61 The fact principle, as noted previously, con-
sists in the assumption that enforced separation of the races does not
imply the inferiority of either race to the other.62
In essence, the legal argument is that segregation statutes are
necessary to maintain peace and good order. It is reasoned that any
judicial razing of the state-erected barriers, which now separate the
races, would so offend the mores of the southern community that
violence and race conflict would result.6 3 Since a state may properly
act to preserve the peace, it is contended that segregation statutes are
nothing more than a valid exercise of that right.
It is true that the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not divest the states of their right to make regulations for the promo-
tion of health, peace, and good order. 4 But this power must be exer-
cised in subordination to the provisions of the Federal Constitution. 65
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by
preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preserva-
tion of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.66
It is not sufficient that police action should meet the test of due
process. The Constitution demands more. A police regulation, like
any other state action, is subject to the equal protection of the laws. 67
Therefore, the validity of segregation legislation is not alone depen-
dent upon its reasonableness in the light of established custom.68 It
must qualify under the test of equal protection, i.e., it must be non-
discriminatory both in its operation and in its effect.69
Do segregated school statutes qualify under this test? It is
submitted that they do not. The basic premise of the Supreme Court
61 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 550 (1896); Briggs v. Elliott, 98
F. Supp. 529, 532 (1951). Bt see Carr v. Corning, 182 F. 2d 14, 33 (dissent-
ing opinion of Edgerton, J.) : "It is sometimes suggested that due process of
law cannot require what law cannot enforce. No such suggestion is relevant
here. When United States courts order integration of District of Columbia
schools they will be integrated. It has been too long forgotten that the Dis-
trict of Columbia is not a provisional community but the cosmopolitan capital
of a nation that professes democracy." Judge Edgerton's words could well be
applied to the whole judicial attitude toward the South and segregation. It
has been too long argued that segregation should not be abolished, because the
Southern community would neither tolerate nor accept the abolition. But this
argument is without validity; the question is not one of judicial power or politi-
cal expediency. It is a question of constitutional right.
62 See note 17 supra.
63 See note 4 supra.
64 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
65 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm., 294 U. S.
613 (1935).
66 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 81 (1917).6 7 See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59
(1915).
68 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886); Barbier v. Con-
nolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (1885).
69 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 23 (1948).
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in Plessy v. Ferguson was erroneous. Enforced segregation does
imply inferiority. 70 Indeed, it would seem that it is intended to do
so. 71 That it succeeds of its purpose has been attested to by sociolo-
gists, 72 psychiatrists, 73 and even judicial finding:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanc-
tion of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the intferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of
Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive
in a social integrated school system. (Italics added.) 74
So viewed, it would seem that the Plessy case was wrongly de-
cided, and should be overruled.7 5 However, the Court need not neces-
sarily make its decision at this time. None of the three recent cases
discussed supra squarely puts in issue the validity of the "separate
but equal" doctrine. 78 The Court, if it chooses, may avoid the con-
stitutional question, and correctly dispose of each case without dis-
turbing the Plessy precedent.
Briggs v. Elliott,77 the first of the noted cases, could quite prop-
erly be decided on the basis of the Sipuel case. The petitioners are
entitled to equal facilities now. At present, the State of South Caro-
lina offers only a promise of future equality, and promises cannot
constitutionally be substituted for present rights.
78
Gonaales v. Sheely,79 if appealed, might well be sustained on a
simple application of the "separate but equal" doctrine. There, in
addition to the findings noted earlier (academic retardation occasioned
by lack of exposure to English language; necessity of socially inte-
grated education for the preservation of American ideals and insti-
tutions), there was also evidence of distinct inequalities in the physical
facilities offered to the children of Mexican descent.
Brown v. Board of Education,"° however, would seem to present
70 See Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947) ; MY AL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
643 (1944).
71 Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 542 (1951) (dissenting opinion of
Waring, J.).
72 See authorities collected in Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947).
7 Ibid.
74 Finding of fact No. VIII, Brown v. Board of Education, CIVIL AcION
No. T-316 (D. Kan. 1951). This finding does not appear in the published re-
port of the case, which appears in 98 F. Supp. 797 (1951).
75 Accord, Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947).7 5For a contrary view, see 11 LAw. GuiLD REv. 151, 155 (1951). The
writer there takes the position that the Briggs case squarely raises the issue
of the validity of segregation per se. For another discussion of the Briggs
case, see 4 So. CAROLINA L. Q. 177 (1951).
77 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951).
78 Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948).
79 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951).
80 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
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a new question for the Court. There, there was a distinct finding
of equality in physical facilities, coupled with a finding that segrega-
tion has a detrimental effect upon Negro children since ".... separat-
ing the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
Negro group." 81 This finding is apparently in direct conflict with
the basic fact principle of the "separate but equal" doctrine. Never-
theless, if the Court chooses, it may escape the necessity of a direct
ruling on the validity of segregation per se, and decide the issues on
,the rationale of the McLaurin decision. The right of "intellectual
commingling" which was there said to be an element of equality on
the graduate school level, can logically, and should properly, be ex-
tended to education on the lower academic planes.
Perhaps, however, the Court will choose to rule directly on the
applicability of the "separate but equal" doctrine. There is some evi-
dence that it is not yet willing to go that far.8 2 It would seem, how-
ever, that it cannot avoid the issues altogether. The District Court
has found as a fact that the effects of enforced segregation are detri-
mental and hence discriminatory. It has nevertheless refused to re-
strain the discrimination. If, as was said in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,83
"... the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws . . .," 4 the Supreme Court cannot acquiesce in the
inconsistency.
Jus TERTII UNDER CoMMoN LAW AND THE N.I.L.
Introduction
A jus tertii situation arises when the defendant has no defense
of his own but wishes to defeat the plaintiff's action by alleging a
defect in the plaintiff's title or the fact that the plaintiff has no title
at all. The defendant, in substance, admits that he owes the debt
sued on, but denies that he owes it to this plaintiff because of some
outstanding right in a third person. When such a situation occurs
many problems manifest themselves. The purpose of this article is
to present the basic fact situations in which these problems arise and
to attempt to clarify the status of the law in this respect through an
analysis both of judicial opinions and relevant sections of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law.
Some sections of the New York Negotiable Instruments Law
specifically forbid the use of jus tertii. For example, Section 41
81 See note 74 supra.
82 See note 57 suPra.
83 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
84 Id. at 369.
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